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Despite enormous growth in the study of learners’ cognitive processes, relatively
little is known about how learners reason about social phenomena and issues
involved in disciplines, such as history. Yet, according to scholars the process
could hardly be more important, and it demands redress and scientific expla-
nation. To contribute to the understanding of learners’ reasoning about historical
issues, an empirical research project, on the cognitive processes of learners’
while explaining the causes of an historical event, was undertaken. The data
obtained showed that difference in age and expertise tended to lead to different
types of historical explanation. A model to induce learners’ understanding of an
historical event is put forward. 
Keywords: Africa; cognitive; colonialism; history; learners
Introduction and statement of the problem
Included in most school history policy documents published in South Africa
since 1994 is the notion that in the history classroom learners’ ability to think
and understand should not be considered as something separate from the
history curriculum, but as a tool for promoting better historical understan-
ding (Department of Education, 2000:1-8; Department of Education, 2002a:
1-13; Department of Education, 2002b:1-10; Department of Education, 2003:
2-16). This is in line with the increasing trend amongst scholars to establish
a relationship between school subject content and learners’ ability to think
and understand (Carretero, Jacott, Limón, Lopez-Manjón & León, 1994:357-
359). 
 The problem that underlay this study centred around two issues, namely,
the cognitive processes involved in learners’ explanation of the causes of an
historical event, and how history teachers go about preparing learners, to un-
derstand and explain historical events, and supporting the processes involved.
According to scholars such as Mulholland and Ludlow (1992:28-29) and She-
milt (1980:30) learners find the explanation of the causes of historical events
very difficult. Haydn, Arthur and Hunt (1997:17), Scott (1990:9) and Shemilt
(1980:30) summarise some of the chief challenges faced by learners when
discussing and assessing the causes of an historical event: mistaking events
and facts for causes; not able to identify connections between cause and ef-
fect; only appreciating monocausal rather than multicausal factors; not  able
to appreciate the different significances of cause and consequence; not aware
of categories (e.g. social, political, economic); not able to distinguish between
long-term, medium-term and short-term cause and consequence; have a ten-
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dency to accept inevitably and to dismiss contingency; and fail to understand
the complexity of motivation in history. According to Inhelder and Piaget
(1958:64-65) and Steele (1985:14) the development of learners’ capacity to
think about the causes of historical events is only partly the product of
physical maturation; it is also greatly affected by their learning experiences,
both inside and outside the school situation.
Mulholland and Ludlow (1992:28) and Voss (1993:1), respectively, state
the following regarding learners’ learning experiences of the causes of histo-
rical events in the history classroom: “... for many years, causes and effects
of historical events were offered to learners in South African public schools as
recipes and not as something to think about”, and “... too often schools have
dealt with causation in history uncritically”. Shemilt’s (1980:79) research on
the teaching of the causes of historical events confirms the above statements:
“... although learners could grasp the idea that a historical cause was some-
thing with the ‘power to make something else happen’, they often could not
identify, articulate or understand the direct connection — the causal  link —
between cause and effect”. The reason for this, according to the Report of the
History/Archaeology Panel (Department of Education, 2000:1-8) and Shemilt
(1980:33), is educators’ and textbooks’ portrayal of the causes of events as cut
and dried and indisputable. Educators dictate or ask learners to copy the
“recognised” causes of certain events. Textbooks also do not explain the con-
nections between cause and effect (Voss, 1993:2). 
Voss and Carretero (1994:12) conducted empirical investigations into the
nature of formal reasoning in history issues and pointed out that this re-
search shows that learners can generate effective arguments outside school.
They can skilfully persuade parents to grant privileges or convince friends to
concede a point of view. “But ask those same kids to construct argument in
history, and they can’t do it.” Voss and Carretero (1994:13) believe history
teachers should build on learners’ demonstrated ability to argue by explicitly
teaching argumentation and analysis.
One would expect the cognitive processes related to history to be one of
the principal areas of research among history scholars in South Africa, but
this has not been the case, as Kapp (1998:115-116) confirms: “… history
scholars and practitioners in South Africa can unfortunately not draw on a
substantial body of empirical research findings …”. Researchers worldwide
also seem to have forgotten the topic of cognitive processes in history for only
a small number of contributions have been devoted to this topic (Voss &
Carretero, 1994:1; 5). According to Carretero et al. (1994:210) the above
anomaly demands redress and scientific explanation. 
Against the backdrop of the preceding discussion, the following research
questions could be formulated:
• What kind of cognitive processes are involved when learners have to ex-
plain the causes of an historical event?
• What could be done in South African public schools to enhance the his-
torical thinking and understanding of learners? 
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Purpose of the study
With the above research questions in mind, the purpose was to provide his-
tory teachers and teacher educators with an outline of scholars’ views of what
constitutes historical thinking and understanding; to report the outcomes of
an empirical study of the cognitive processes involved when learners have to
explain the causes of an historical event; and to describe  a model that has
been shown by research and in practice to be effective in supporting learners’
historical thinking and understanding. History teachers and teacher educa-
tors can then also use this to enhance the historical thinking and understan-
ding of learners in South African public schools. 
In order to achieve the purpose, the concept ‘historical explanation’ was
clarified; a review of the international literature pertaining to learners’ cogni-
tive processes in history was done; an empirical study particular for the South
African situation was undertaken; and conclusions and recommendations
were put forward. 
Clarification of the concept ‘historical explanation’
According to Stanford (1996:1) the duty of historians does not stop at ac-
counts of events; they also have to explain the events. One of the fundamental
problems in the philosophy of science has been to determine what is the
nature of scientific explanations: Are the scientific explanations the same for
all the sciences, or do they differ, depending on which science is being consi-
dered? The above question has been discussed at length by philosophers
throughout the history of sciences. Two sides of this debate have come to be
represented by important philosophical schools of thought. On the one hand,
the positivist school of thought takes the view that the explanatory scheme
(the scientific or the nomological-deductive) used in the natural sciences is
considered as the ideal explanatory model for all sciences (Benton & Craib,
2001:13-27; Stanford, 1996:1-6). On the other hand, there is another school
of thought that draws a distinct line between the approach to explanation in
the natural sciences and that in the social sciences (Burger, 1977:168-173).
In the social sciences, there has been a long and unsettled argument: how
far should the social sciences adhere to the methods of the natural sciences?
(Benton & Craib, 2001:8-9). One of the theoretical models to answer the above
question, in the social sciences and history, is the teleological or intentional
model of explanation proposed by Von Wright (1971:371-413). It is based on
the assumption that the methods of the natural sciences cannot be trans-
ferred to the social sciences, given the different nature of the two types of
science. As has often been pointed out by scholars, such as Collingwood
(1946:20) and Dray (1957:43), to understand human behaviour the social
sciences do not have to rely solely upon external observation (as the natural
sciences do) but the social sciences have an insight into the subject matter
(human behaviour). The social sciences know what it is to be human. This
insight is particularly valuable when it comes to explaining human actions:
the social sciences can often perfectly understand the intentions of the agents.
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This leads to the establishment of fundamental differences between causal
explanation advance in natural sciences and intentional explanation focusing
fundamentally on human (rational purposive) action — proposed as being
suitable for the study of history. History, from this perspective, is defined as
the study of human actions, i.e. it is concerned with the reconstruction of the
lives of people in other times and places (Collingwood, 1946:19). To explain
an action teleologically or intentionally implies the understanding of a parti-
cular intention in the actor who performs it; that intention constitutes its
most characteristic feature. For this reason historical explanations are of a
different type to those in the natural sciences (Dray, 1957:42). Therefore, the
distinction between nomothetic sciences, referring to those sciences whose
objective is the production of general and invariable laws, and idiographic
sciences, which concentrate on the study of particular entities or the indi-
vidual (Windelband as quoted in Dray, 1957:43). 
Historical explanation is not altogether distinctive, it has problems of its
own. Consideration of the importance of insight into human behaviour has led
historians and social scientists to develop action theory, i.e. to make an analy-
sis of what is involved in human actions. Five elements are usually distin-
guished: aim, assessment of situation, choice of means, drive (or motive), and
context (Stanford, 1996:2-6). According to Goertz (2007:1-4) and Stanford
(1996:2) many occurrences, past and present, can be explained like this.
However, events often do not turn out as intended. Therefore an explanation
in terms of intention may be quite inadequate. The historian has to look else-
where. Sometimes he/she can find satisfactory explanations in the natural
sciences. Alone they do not provide a satisfactory or comprehensive explana-
tion. It seems that historians then have to look for causes in order to give a
satisfactory explanation. Von Wright (1971:371-413) states that the explana-
tion of historical facts involves taking into account the occurrence of one or
more prior events that can be considered as “contributory causes”. The notion
of cause is almost inextricable from the study of history though there have
been scholars, such as Oakeshott (1933:43), who deny its relevance. Never-
theless, according to Stanford (1996:3) and Newton (2001:182) historians are
normally much concerned with causes. Among these are causes of the sci-
entific kind, causes of the intentional kind, and the chains of events which
bring about results neither intended by the agents nor explicable by any
general law, either of the natural sciences or the social sciences. In such cases
the historian is left to speculate about the one or the many combined causes
that could have brought about such a result. 
By an historical cause (or set of causes) the historian understands that
event without which the effect would not have occurred. Unfortunately, since
there are no laws of history comparable, say, to the laws of chemistry, the
historian cannot predict what would have happened without the alleged
cause. He/she may suppose that without a particular cause the result would
not have come about. But this is counter-factual speculation. Fortunately, the
historian is not entirely without guidance as to at least the more likely causes.
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For Collingwood (1961:285) the question of the cause of an occurrence is
equivalent to the question, How can we bring about, or prevent, such an
occurrence? The answer is often found in an abnormal condition. This method
is far from infallible, but it is helpful.
In explaining historical events, historians are also influenced by values
and political attitudes. Consequently there are  presently, according to Carre-
tero et al. (1994:363-365) and Goertz (2007:1-4), a number of historiogra-
phical approaches that are based on very distinct theories: the positivist ap-
proach focusing on empirical data and the role of great historical figures; the
structural approach defending an historical view based on the interaction of
economic and social structures in which particular persons do not play a
crucial role; the marxist approach holding a similar position as the structural
approach but not identical because of its emphasis on the existence of mate-
rialistic dialectical laws based on Hegel’s philosophy of history; and the men-
talities approach focusing on research activity of an ideological nature and
private-life events of the past. Therefore, when studying the causes of an
historical event, any of these approaches will select its data according to its
more general theory. 
    
Method of research 
Literature review 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, it was the philosophic-historical views of
Burston and Green (1964:80), Burston and Thompson (1967:93), Collingwood
(1961:27-28), and Walsh (1971:65-84) that dominated professional debate
about what constituted historical thinking and understanding. The focus of
this debate changed, however, from the mid-1960s onwards as the growing
importance of educational psychology shifted discussion from a narrow epis-
temological discourse to a broader cognitive approach. 
The psychological studies of Inhelder and Piaget (1958:64-65) were adop-
ted by Peel (1967:159-190) and Hallam (1970:165-178) to develop a model of
learners’ historical thinking and understanding. These researchers asserted
that the three Piagetian stages (pre-operational; concrete operational; formal
operational) seemed to correspond to stages in the development of historical
thinking and understanding in learners. At the pre-operational stage (0 to 7
years) young learners often failed to make sense of historical information. At
the concrete operational stage (7 to 11 years) learners could describe histori-
cal events. At the formal operational stage (11 years to adult) learners could
make effective inferences from limited information and hypothesise as to moti-
vation and the causes of historical events. Peel (1967:159-190) termed the
latter two stages the descriptive (concrete operational) and explanatory (formal
operational) stages, respectively. These researchers soon faced criticism for
trying too hard to slot the development of learners’ historical thinking and
understanding into the schematic three-stage model of chronological deve-
lopment (Booth, 1987:18-20; Cooper, 1994:102-121).
Dickinson and Lee (1978:92-120) therefore looked at defining historical
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thinking and understanding without examining stages of psychological deve-
lopment. They suggested that an important aspect of historical thinking and
understanding is the capacity to distinguish between, on the one hand, con-
temporary values and perspectives (presentism) when examining an historical
problem, and on the other hand, contemporaneous values and perspectives
(real history). Dickinson and Lee’s (1978:92-120) views on the need for the
development of a capacity for understanding the perspectives of the past have
been vitiated by the so-called Youth and History Project, which was quite
pessimistic about the capacity of adolescents to produce these complex levels
of understanding and explanation (Korber, 1998:123-138). However, McAleavy
(1998:139-142) has suggested that in-depth historical study may be a way of
overcoming this kind of difficulty, and, according to Howells (1998:16-19),
some quite advanced historical concepts such as inevitability may be under-
stood by age 7, 8, and 9 learners if a lesson receives enough study time (Aus-
tralian Government, 2006:4-5). 
Booth (1979:12-14) identified a further unique element of historical think-
ing and understanding: history requires adductive skills, in contrast to esta-
blished ideas of inductive or deductive scientific thinking. School history’s
difference is that it is speculative, imaginative, vicarious, and persuasive, and
its idiographic underpinning adds a further dimension to its uniqueness.
Booth’s (1979:14-15) use of the term adductive also referred to learners addu-
cing answers to quite specific questions. Booth (1979:15-16) asserted that,
unlike a scientist, an historian asks open-ended questions and uses selected
facts to produce an explanatory pattern.
Lee (1998:29-32) has examined the ideas of learners (7- to 14-year-olds)
about differing historical accounts to see if there are stages of progression in
historical comprehension which might be mapped. His findings show that
young learners (7-year-olds) see all historical sources as essentially the same
and are unable to differentiate between them. These younger learners also
pointed out that direct access to “the past” was impossible in the words of one
child, “Because no-one from them days is alive today”. According to Lee (1998:
29-32), older learners were more likely to emphasise the role of the author(s)
in these historical sources, and a small group of the older learners saw that
accounts might not have been complete. According to Lee (1998:29-32), one
may conclude that younger learners need to learn, in a basic way, how to
differentiate between kinds of stories (myths, legends, differing historical
accounts), and that older learners need to be aware that valid historical ex-
planation may be attempted even when there are evidential gaps. Shemilt
(1980:18-25) showed that learners who were taught using an historical
methodology approach (i.e. evidence-based and concept-led) were either more
likely to use high level historical thinking and understanding than the equiva-
lent control group, or they were more likely to regard historical explanation
as a series of propositions (Australian Government, 2006:5-6). 
With the information obtained from the above international literature, an
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empirical study, particular to the South African situation and which produced
descriptive statistical data, was undertaken.
    
Empirical study
Questionnaire
To obtain data about the cognitive processes involved when learners explain
the causes of an historical event (Colonialism in Africa) a questionnaire was
developed. Peel’s (1967:159-190) and Hallam’s (1970:165-178) model of lear-
ners’ historical conceptual development, and Carretero et al.’s (1994:210)
findings of a 1994 research project about causal explanation in history, using
different tasks, were used in planning the questionnaire. According to the
above scholars, age and expertise tend to have an influence on the way a
learner explains the causes of an historical event. 
The questionnaire comprised three sections. The purpose of Section 1
was to establish the ages of the respondents in order to determine if age plays
a role when respondents have to explain the causes of an historical event. The
following age groups were presented to the respondents: 14 to 15 years old,
16 to 17 years old, 18 to 19 years old, and 22 years and older. The respon-
dents were requested to tick off their specific age in the applicable block. The
above age groups were chosen for the sample because of the views of Peel
(1967:159-190) and Hallam (1970:165-178). They pointed out that history is
an abstract subject that cannot be understood at a stage well below the
formal operational stage, 16.2 to 16.6 years. Only at the formal operational
stage or so-called explanatory stage would learners be able to make effective
inferences from limited information and hypothesise as to motivation and
causation. However, it should be borne in mind that, according to researchers
such as McAleavy (1998:139-142) and Howells (1998:16-19), some quite
advanced historical thinking and understanding was observed by younger
learners where historical events were studied in depth and enough time was
allocated to the study of the events (Australian Government, 2006:4-5). 
The purpose of Section 2 of the questionnaire was to determine if exper-
tise plays a role when respondents explain the causes of an historical event.
The following ordinal question was presented to the respondents “What cau-
sed colonialism in Africa?” In an effort to obtain a precise answer to the ques-
tion, respondents were presented with six factors. Each factor could be
considered as a possible cause of the historical event. Respondents had to
rank the six factors according to the significance of each in the causation of
the historical event, ranking the most important factor first and the least
important factor last (sixth). Table 1 contains the factors presented to the res-
pondents. The information provided with regard to the six factors was based
on the main factors presented in textbooks (Dugmore, Mulholland, Nussey,
Siebörger & Torr, 1999:88-104; O’Callaghan, 1997:215-217; Seleti, Dyer,
Naidoo, Nisbet, Roberts, Saunders & Clacherty, 2000:243-272) as explanation
of the historical event. The decision to include only these six factors in the
questionnaire was made after a study of the following theories of colonialism:
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economic imperialism, European nationalism, the revisionist explanation, and
the strategic explanation (Seleti et al. 2000:246-248). “Colonialism in Africa”
was chosen as the knowledge focus area for the research project because of
its presence as a topic in social sciences and history curricula of primary and
secondary public schools, pre-1998 as well as post-1998. All respondents
would therefore have some tacit knowledge of the topic.
Table 1 Different types of causes
Intentional: David Livingstone, Henry Morton Stanley, Leopold II of Belgium.
Motives: ambition, curiosity, desire of adventure and wealth.
Ideological: Legends, myths and tales about the existence of remote lands
(Monomotapa).
Economic: European countries were driven to acquire colonies by their desire for
higher profit, search for gold, cheap labour, and new markets to invest their
surplus capital.
Scientific-technological: Scientific-technological changes in European medicine,
metal-works, the military and civil service all gave Europeans advantages over
indigenous Africans. 
Political: Great competition existed between European nations causing tension
and encouraging nationalistic feelings. These European rivalries were expressed
in the partition of Africa as the European nations competed with each other by
claiming colonies. 
Strategic: European powers colonised Africa to protect their own military and
trade interest. Britain occupied South Africa to secure her sea lanes to India.
 
The purpose of Section 3 of the questionnaire was to determine if respon-
dents’ spontaneous explanation, of how Africa was colonised, confirmed their
ranking of the six causes of the historical event in Section 2. An open question
was presented to the respondents in which they were requested to narrate
their understanding of how Africa was colonised. The initial draft of the ques-
tionnaire was discussed with an expert to determine the validity of the three
sections. It resulted in a change of wording in an attempt to ensure that the
respondents understood the gist of the three sections. 
Respondents
Fifty respondents (five groups of 10) participated in the research project.
Three of the five groups comprised adolescents of the following age groups: 14
to 15 years, 16 to 17 years, and 18 to 19 years. The adolescent respondents
came from a public school in the Johannesburg West: D12 area. All the ado-
lescent respondents had been exposed to history instruction during their pri-
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mary and/or secondary school careers. The two remaining groups comprised
adults older than 22 years of age enrolled for the Postgraduate Certificate in
Education (Senior Phase and FET) at a South African university: one group
consisted of Learning Area Didactics Life Orientation students, with lan-
guages, psychology, biblical studies, or religious studies as majors for their
bachelor’s degree; and the other group was made up of Subject Didactics
History students, with history as major for their bachelor’s degree. All the
Learning Area Didactics Life Orientation students had been exposed to history
instruction during their primary school careers. The expertise (length and
experience of history study) of the sample varied from informal or tacit know-
ledge to formal or extensive knowledge of the historical event. The adult res-
pondents were from all over the province of Gauteng.
Data collection
Two months prior to the administration of the questionnaires, permission was
obtained from all participants. The questionnaires were administered during
five sessions. It was done by the Johannesburg West: D12 office and the re-
searcher. A representative of the Johannesburg West: D12 office applied the
questionnaires to the three adolescent groups within a classroom situation at
the public school in the presence of the classroom teachers. The adolescent
respondents did not complete the questionnaires all at once. The possibility
therefore existed that those respondents who had completed the question-
naires during the first sessions would have discussed the content of the
questionnaires with their peers, and this might have influenced the outcomes
of the survey. The questionnaires to the two adult groups were applied by the
researcher herself  in a classroom situation during the two annual day semi-
nars held for each of these two groups. 
The procedure for both groups was identical. Prior to the completion of
the questionnaires, the instructions were read out loud to the respondents.
Difficult words were explained, as any misunderstanding could have influen-
ced the results of some of the respondents. The respondents were encouraged
to ask questions prior to and during the completion of the questionnaires, and
were ensured that they could take all the time they needed to complete the
questionnaires. Participants’ anonymity was assured and voluntary participa-
tion in the research project was ascertained. Respondents were asked to write
their responses as comprehensively as possible on the questionnaire paper
itself. A 100% response rate was obtained because the researcher stayed in
close contact with the Johannesburg West D16 representative prior to, during
and after the completion of the questionnaires, by telephone, correspondence,
and courier. The questionnaires of the two adult groups were completed in the
presence of the researcher and thus collected by the researcher herself. The
collected data were then prepared for analysis. The tabulated data were sub-
jected to statistical analysis using mean ranking scores. Respondents’ ranking
of the causal factors was assessed on a scale of 1 to 6. A high ranking of a
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factor was represented by a 1 and a low ranking by a 6. A mean score of 3.50
or higher was interpreted as a low ranking of a factor, and a mean score of
less than 3.50 as a high ranking of a factor.  
Results 
Table 2 shows the rankings of the total sample (n = 50) of importance of the
factors. 
The results of the completed questionnaires are presented in three parts.
Part I: Ranking of the causal factors between the groups
A close reading of the tabulated data revealed differences as well as simila-
rities  between the groups. Significant differences were observed regarding the
intentional, political and strategic factors. Mean scores for the intentional
factor: 14 to 15 years (M = 1.60); 16 to 17 years (M = 2.15); 18 to 19 years (M=
2.50); non-history graduates (M = 2.60); history graduates (M = 4.10). Mean
scores for the political factor: 14 to 15 years (M = 4.45); 16 to 17 years (M =
3.55); 18 to 19 years (M = 3.65); non-history graduates (M = 3.50); and history
graduates (M = 3.00). Mean scores for the strategic factor: 14 to 15 years (M=
4.90); 16 to 17 years (M = 4.85); 18 to 19 years (M = 4.15); non-history
graduates (M = 3.65); history graduates (M = 3.45).Analysis of the above mean
scores revealed that history graduates differed significantly from the 14 to 15
years group with respect to the intentional factor. The data indicated that the
14 to15 years group ranked the intentional factor (M = 1.60) as the most
important factor, whereas history graduates ranked it (M = 4.10) as the se-
cond lowest factor. The intentional factor featured strongly in historical expla-
nations of adolescents, but not for those respondents who were experts in the
history domain. In the case of the political factor, history graduates differed
significantly from the 14 to 15 years group, but their answers were the oppo-
site of answers concerning the intentional factor. The history graduates rank-
ed the political factor as the second most important factor (M = 3.00), whereas
the 14 to 15 years group ranked it as the second least important factor (M =
4.45). The data suggested that history graduates considered the relevance of
more abstract and complex factors when they explained this historical event.
On the contrary, the 14 to 15 years group awarded much less importance to
the political factor in their explanation. The data revealed that the 16 to 17
years and 18 to 19 years groups and the non-history graduates assigned a
similar degree of importance to the intentional (M = 2.15, M = 2.50 and M =
2.60, respectively) and political (M = 3.55, M = 3.65 and M = 3.50, respec-
tively) factors. The results obtained regarding the strategic factor indicated
that history graduates (M = 3.45) and non-history graduates (M = 3.65) differ-
ed significantly from the 14 to 15 years (M = 4.90), 16 to 17 years (M = 4.85),
and 18 to 19 years (M = 4.15) with the adult graduates assigning a higher
level of importance to the strategic factor than the adolescents. 
The similarities among the groups related to the remaining factors — the
economic, scientific-technological and ideological factors. The mean scores for
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Table 2 Group mean rankings (M) and standard deviations (SD) of the importance of each factor in the explanation of colonialism in Africa
Groups
Causal factors 14 to 15 years 16 to 17 years 18 to 19 years
Non-history
graduates History graduates



































































































the scientific-technological factor were: 14 to 15 years (M = 2.60); 16 to 17
years (M = 3.05); 18 to 19 years (M = 3.50); non-history graduates (M = 3.65);
history graduates (M = 3.10). The mean scores for the economic factor were:
14 to 15 years (M = 3.00); 16 to 17 years (M = 2.40); 18 to 19 years (M = 1.70);
non-history graduates (M = 2.20); history graduates (M = 2.05). All the groups
attributed a rather intermediate level of importance to the scientific-techno-
logical and economic factors. The exception here is the 18 to 19 years group
and the history graduates, whose mean scores for the economic factor were
(M = 1.70) and (M = 2.05), respectively. In the case of the ideological factor all
the groups considered it to have a very low level of importance: 14 to 15 years
(M = 4.15); 16 to 17 years (M = 4.70); 18 to 19 years (M = 5.20); non-history
graduates (M = 5.10); history graduates (M = 5.05).
Part 2: Ranking of the causal factors within groups
A close reading of the tabulated data revealed significant differences within
the groups. The data showed that the adolescent groups’ ranking of the causal
factors in their explanation of the historical event differed significantly from
the adult groups. The adolescents ranked the six given causal factors as
follows: The 14 to 15 years group ranked the intentional factor (M = 1.60)
significantly different with respect to the ideological (M = 4.15), political (M =
4.45), and strategic (M = 4.90) factors. The results indicated that the intentio-
nal factor was the most important factor whereas the ideological, political and
strategic factors were the lowest factors in their explanation of the historical
event. An intermediate level of importance was assigned to the economic (M=
3.00) and scientific-technological (M = 2.60) factors. The 16 to 17 years group
ranked the intentional (M = 2.15) and economic factors (M = 2.40) significantly
different with respect to the ideological (M = 4.70) and strategic (M = 4.85)
factors. The results indicated that the intentional and economic factors were
the most important factors whereas the ideological and strategic factors were
the lowest factors in their explanation of the historical event. An intermediate
level of importance was assigned to the political (M = 3.55) and
scientific-ideological (M = 3.05) factors. The 18 to 19 year-olds ranked the
economic (M = 1.70) and intentional (M = 2.50) factors differently with respect
to the ideological (M = 5.20) and strategic (M = 4.15) factors. The results indi-
cated that the economic and intentional factors were the most important
factors whereas the ideological and strategic factors were the lowest factors
in their explanation of the historical event. An intermediate level of impor-
tance was assigned to the political (M = 3.65) and scientific-technological (M=
3.50) factors. 
The adults ranked the six given causal factors as follows: The non-history
graduates considered a combination of intentional and structural factors in
their explanation of the historical event. The non-history graduates ranked
the economic (M = 2.20) and intentional (M = 2.60) factors as more important
in their explanation of the historical event than structural factors such as the
political (M = 3.50), scientific-technological (M = 3.65) and strategic (M = 3.65)
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factors. The non-history graduates considered the ideological (M = 5.10) factor
as the least important factor. The history graduates considered structural
factors to be more important in their historical explanation than the inten-
tional factor. History graduates ranked the economic (M = 2.05), political (M=
3.00), scientific-technological (M = 3.10) and strategic (M = 3.45) factors as
more important in their explanation of the historical event than the inten-
tional (M = 4.10) and ideological (M = 5.05) factors. 
Part 3: Narration 
The data in Part 3 were obtained by analysing Section 3 of the questionnaire,
which was the respondents’ spontaneous narration of how Africa was colo-
nised. The type of agents mentioned by the respondents as agents of the
historical event and their motives for being involved in the historical event
were used as categories for analysis purposes (Atkinson, 1978:18-20; Lomas,
1990:10-12). The results obtained from the respondents’ spontaneous nar-
ration of how Africa was colonised are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 Respondents’ spontaneous explanation of how Africa was colonised
  Age/Expertise   Agents   Motives
Adolescents:
  14 to 15 and 16 to 17
   years
  18 to 19 years
Adults:
  Non-history graduates
  History graduates
Personal: British queen,












Personal: desire to explore












In the respondents’ spontaneous explanation of how Africa was colonised,
they considered agents and motives which matched their ranking of the six
factors. The consideration by the 14 to 15 years and 16 to 17 years adoles-
cents’ of personal agents (British queen, British men and soldiers, merchants,
king, etc.) and personal motives (desires, ambition, colonization, need of
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exploration, etc.) confirmed the importance given to the intentional factor (M=
1.60) and (M = 2.15), respectively, in their ranking of the factors. The 18 to 19
years adolescents’ consideration of personal agents (Mussolini, Italians, Ger-
mans, army, Europeans, kings, etc.) and economic motives (minerals, econo-
my, trade, profits, railway, money, etc.) agreed with the importance given to
the intentional (M = 2.50) and economic (M = 1.70) factors in their ranking of
the factors. The consideration of adult non-history graduates of personal
agents (war, soldiers, armies, armaments, etc.) and economic motives (dia-
monds, rich, gold, labour, desire of territorial control, etc.) agreed with the
importance given to the intentional (M = 2.60) and economic (M = 2.20) factors
in their ranking of the factors. The consideration of adult history graduates
of social and political agents (civilize, education, religion, imperialism, mon-
arch, Britain, crown, etc.) and abstract motives (political, economic, strategic,
scientific-technological, etc.) agreed with the importance awarded to the
economic (M=2.05), political (M=3.00) and scientific-technological (M = 3.10)
factors in their ranking of the factors. The results obtained in Section 2, the
ranking of the six factors and Section 3, the spontaneous explanation of how
Africa was colonised, were congruent.
Discussion
The results are reviewed in terms of the research findings of international
scholars such as Bereiter and Scardamalia (1993), Carretero et al. (1994) and
Halldén (1986), who conducted similar studies during the past two decades.
In a project conducted by Halldén (1986:53-66) in the 1980s, he observed that
a personalised understanding of history is common among many adolescents.
According to Halldén (1986:123-124) adolescents tend to consider the influ-
ence of specific persons in historical events to be much more important than
abstract and non-personalised factors, such as political and social structures.
He did however argue that the main reason for this could be that considering
abstract issues would imply a much more in-depth knowledge of social and
historical processes, which most adolescents are unable to obtain before they
are 17 or 18 years old.
Bereiter and Scardamalia (1993:46-72) conducted a research project in
the 1990s regarding the different types of knowledge applicable when learners
have to explain an historical event.  According to Bereiter and Scardamalia
(1993:46-72), in the case of younger learners tacit knowledge usually plays
a greater role than historical skill, as these learners commonly use their
informal knowledge to explain the causes of an historical event. On the other
hand, adult history graduates will use their formal knowledge or extensive
knowledge base of history to explain the causes of an historical event; whilst
adult non-history graduates use their tacit as well as metacognitive knowledge
to explain the causes of an historical event. 
Carretero et al. (1994:46-72) published research findings in the 1990s
which involved an outline of different approaches (the structural approach
and the narrative approach) in history teaching during the last century and
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respondents’ explanation of historical events. According to Carretero et al.
(1994:46-72) the legacy of the above teaching approaches may be useful to
explain how the respondents in their study thought about historical contents
using personal agents only. In the first case (the structural approach),
personal agents had almost no influence, and the most influential variables
were political, economic and social factors. In this case these variables can be
considered as similar to the physical variables in the sense of producing some
type of historical regularities. In the second case (the narrative approach),
history was seen as a narrative enterprise that is based on a different type of
logic. The narrative approach played an important role in how history was
taught in public schools worldwide. Very often, the way history was taught,
consisted of offering the “story of the past”. This could partly explain the
results of their study. Did the adolescents and the adult non-experts in
history involved in their study generate an intentional explanation partly
because of the widespread conception of history as a “story of the past”? If
history teaching was oriented in a different way would these respondents have
generated different explanations? According to Carretero et al. (1994:46-72)
these are interesting questions open to future research.
The research results of the South African study were similar to those of
the international scholars. The South African study revealed that different
groups of learners produced different historical explanations depending on
their age and knowledge and experience of history. The adolescent learners
considered the influence of specific persons in the historical event to be much
more important than structural factors (see Halldén, 1986). A personalised
understanding of history was therefore also common among the adolescents
involved in the South African study. One of the main reasons for the inten-
tional explanation of the South African adolescents may also be the cognitive
development stage of the learners: considering structural factors would imply
a much more in-depth knowledge of social and historical processes which
most adolescent learners in the concrete operational or descriptive stage of
cognitive development are unable to achieve. The younger adolescent learners
who had attained the concrete operational or descriptive stage of cognitive
development provided historical explanations that emerged from personal
analogies and concentrated on personal rather than collective motivation or
purpose. However, the older adolescent learners who had already attained the
formal operational or explanatory stage of cognitive development provided
historical explanations of the rational purposive type that were more abstract.
Tacit knowledge and familiarity with human action played a greater role in the
adolescents’ explanation of the historical event than historical skill (see Be-
reiter & Scardamalia, 1993). 
The adult history graduates’ explanation bore testimony to their formal
operational or explanatory stage of cognitive development, and they used their
extensive knowledge base of history to explain the causes of the historical
event. Personal agents had almost no influence in their explanation, the most
influential factors were structural factors. The adult non-history graduates’
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explanation also bore testimony to their formal operational or explanatory
stage of cognitive development. Their explanation showed awareness of perso-
nal actions as well as structural factors. They used their tacit knowledge and
familiarity with human action as well as metacognitive knowledge to explain
the causes of the historical event (see Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1993). 
    
Conclusion and recommendations
According to Walsh (1971:28), given the purpose of history as a record of
human events in their proper historical context, the aim of history teaching
is to help learners understand and explain such events. Helping learners to
understand and explain historical events, teachers should have a clear idea
of what constitutes historical explanation, at which level to present the
historical events and seek historical explanation, and of how to induce this
ability in learners.  Evans (1977:38) argued that while learners may be capa-
ble of given the “becauses” of events, what “counts in school history” has to
be learned. According to Newton and Newton (1999:184) learners learn “what
counts” from repeated exposure to it and through the teacher’s guidance.
Given that they have this guidance, there are still requisites that facilitate or
enable a particular historical understanding: for explanatory understanding
learners have to construct an understanding that incorporates the reasons
and intentions involved in the action (Benton & Craib, 2001:181). 
Research on learners’ explanatory understanding of historical events is
a rather recent endeavour, especially as compared to other domains. For this
reason, in this article a generic overview of scholars’ views regarding cognitive
processes in history has been provided. Along with the literature review, the
outcomes of an empirical study of learners’ explanation of the causes of
colonialism in Africa were included. It became apparent, from the results of
the empirical study, that different age and expertise tended to provide dif-
ferent historical explanations. 
One of the learners involved in the research project wrote: “ … in Maths
you can apply the rules, but for History you’ve got to work out the rules
yourself”. The challenges faced by the learners in this respect should be seen
as a means by which teaching opportunities can be identified. Newton’s (2001:
185-188) learning pathway model, proved by research and in practice to be
effective to induce learners’ explanatory understanding ability, might be of
value to South African history teachers. There are several important stages in
the model at which support to learners can be provided. Stage 1 of the model
comprises the requisites. The teacher needs to identify a starting point for the
teaching of the historical event, and be clear about the flow of “happenings”
and why things took the course they did. This will lead to planning with clear
targets in mind and explicit types of understanding (descriptive, observa-
tional, explanatory) to be developed as the history topic unfolds. Stage 2 of the
model comprises the actualisation of the prior knowledge of the learners. The
teacher needs to find out what ideas and experience the learners are bringing
to the classroom. Related concepts and prior experience with topics bearing
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on the new historical event can all be recalled and rehearsed. This will provide
a wider context into which the new historical event can be embedded. 
Stage 3 of the model comprises the process of constructing an understan-
ding of events — the story with causes. The event is to be introduced and
explored so that descriptive understanding can be constructed. The key
characters are to be introduced, their motives and feelings explored, the
relevant events going on around them described, and the sequence of those
events given. This all provides the immediate context for the new understan-
ding and justifies why the starting point is the way it is. Stage 4 of the model
comprises checking that the learners have grasped the key ideas and can give
plausible causes for outcomes. The learners need to know why these are
plausible. According to Newton (2001:186) teachers often present historical
events as pre-digested stories. Narrative is a form well known to learners and
readily grasped by them. The narrative approach, however, can risk conceal-
ing the possibility that other plausible understandings are feasible. According
to Newton (2001:188) attempts to overcome this are generally based on having
learners be “history detectives” drawing on primary sources. All of the above
transitional stages, one way or another, lead to constructing explanatory
understanding — of why things are the way they are or events took the course
they did (Newton, 2001:188). 
Many of the explanations given by the adolescent learners in Section 3 of
the questionnaire were rather simplistic, and although such simplicity might
be explained by knowledge and/or processing inadequacies, the fact that sim-
plistic accounts were obtained suggests that many respondents had a rather
low or mediocre criterion of acceptability for an adequate explanation of the
causes of the historical event. Learners need a strict criterion regarding what
constitutes an acceptable explanation of an historical event: It is therefore
argued that instruction using Newton’s learning pathway model could pro-
duce a better idea of a quality explanation. 
I have attempted to use research outcomes in the fields of psychology and
history didactics to improve history teaching in public school classrooms, and
to serve as an introduction to further thought and research in this regard. 
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